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The Agents-are-Substitutes Property in Continuous
Generalized Assignment Problems
Reinder B. Lok ∗ Dolores Romero Morales † Dries Vermeulen ‡
March 18, 2005
Abstract
The VCG mechanism has some nice properties if the agents-are-substitutes property
holds. For example, for combinatorial auctions the property assures that the VCG mech-
anism is supported by a pricing equilibrium. The existence of such a pricing equilibrium
is a necessary condition for the existence of ascending auctions that are equivalent to the
VCG mechanism. Although it is known that the agents-are-substitutes property is impor-
tant in several settings few problems or subclasses of problems are proven to have the
property. In this paper we show for a class of problems that the agents-are-substitutes
property holds. Moreover we give two rather natural and small extensions that do not
have this property in general. Furthermore we show that in our simple problem class we
need the possibility of price discrimination.
1 Introduction
Classical optimization theory assumes that one planner has to find an optimal solution for a
completely described problem. However in many practical situations knowledge and power
may be distributed over different agents. These decentralized settings are an important issue
in in supply chain management (SCM) where many producers and carriers work together to
deliver the final product. From the field of mechanism design the VCG mechanism is a well
known instrument to align the different goals of agents into a common goal by giving the right
incentives. Although very nice in theory, the practical applicability of the VCG mechanism is
limited. The main problem is that the mechanism might ask for a lot of computation and
communication of confidential information. Many authors pointed out the importance of the
so-called agents-are-substitutes property.
Ausubel and Milgrom [1] discuss why the agents-are-substitutes property is important for
the single-item Vickrey auction. For combinatorial Vickrey auctions Bikhchandani et al. [3]
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showed that the calculations for the VCG mechanism can be reduced considerably in case the
agents-are-substitutes property holds. Furthermore, the property assures that their ascending
price auction is equivalent to the VCG mechanism, i.e. the final transactions are the same.
This is important because in these ascending auctions the communication of information
is limited compared to the VCG mechanism itself. Other arguments in favor of ascending
auctions are given by Cramton [6] and Kagel and Levin [9]. Bikhchandani et al. [3] conjecture
that the agents-are-substitutes property is also a necessary condition for the equivalence of
ascending auctions and the VCG mechanism. De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [16] prove
that the stronger property of submodularity is in general necessary for the existence of an
equivalent ascending auction.
Although it is known that the agents-are-substitutes property is important in several set-
tings few problems or subclasses of problems are proven to have the property. Shapley [13]
proved the agents-are-substitutes property for the classical assignment problem. Topkis [14]
proved the stronger property of submodularity for the transportation problem. Bikhchandani
et al. [3] show that the minimum spanning tree problem has the agents-are-substitutes prop-
erty. They also show that the directed shortest path problem does not have the property. Gale
and Politof [7] link substitutability with graph theory. For example they show that the assign-
ment problem of Shapley [13] is a special case of the maximum weight circulation problem
in a directed graph. Their main result is that substitutability corresponds to parallel arcs in
the graph and complementarity corresponds to arcs in series.
Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] show for the package assignment problem, which is a gen-
eralization of the classical assignment problem, that the agents-are-substitutes property holds
if and only if the VCG mechanism corresponds to a pricing equilibrium and to a core al-
location. In their problem formulation the equilibrium prices correspond to optimal dual
variables. These results are a generalization of the results of Leonard [10] who discussed
the classical assignment problem. Note that Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] do not prove the
agents-are-substitutes property itself for any class of problems. In this paper we prove the
agents-are-substitutes property for a subclass of the package assignment problem. Essentially
Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] use general weakly increasing valuations where we restrict our-
selves to concave piecewise linear valuations. As we actually prove the stronger property
of submodularity, not only the results of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] but also the results
of De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [16] apply to our problem class. We also show that the
agents-are-substitutes property does not hold in general if valuations have a convex part due
to setup-costs. Finally, the agents-are-substitutes property also does not hold in general if we
restrict our setting to integral solutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the ba-
sic definitions of mechanism design. The subclass of the package assignment problem is
described in section 3. Section 4 defines the agents-are-substitutes property, the related sub-
modularity property, the pricing equilibrium and the core. Moreover, in this section we prove
for our class of problems that the VCG mechanism needs price discrimination. The package
assignment model itself is the subject of section 5. We discuss the main results of Bikhchan-
dani and Ostroy [4]. In section 6 we prove that our class of problems is submodular and
therefore has the agents-are-substitutes property. In section 7 we present two extensions of
the problem (which are still special cases of the package assignment problem) that do not
have the agents-are-substitutes property. The paper ends with with a summary of our results
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and further research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Mechanism design
Game theory concerns the mathematical modeling and analysis of conflict situations between
decision makers, called agents. For given situations it is analyzed how rational agents will
act or interact. Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory. It is about the redesign of the
conflict situation itself. By designing a mechanism for a conflict situation it is tried to align
the individual goals of the agents into one common goal.
Before we give a formal definition of a mechanism we need the following. Let A be a
set of agents. Each agent a ∈ A is characterized by its type, denoted by ta. The set of all
possible types that agent a can possibly have is denoted by Ta and is called its type space. Let
T ≡ ∏a∈A Ta be the space of type profiles. Furthermore, let O be a set of outcomes. Each
agent a has, associated with its type ta, a preference relation ta on the set O of outcomes.
The preferences of the agents might be conflicting. Therefore the preferences of the agents
have to be summarized in some way into a single preference relation on O. A function that
maps every type profile on a single preference relation is called a social welfare function. A
social choice function o : T → O is a function that chooses a most preferred outcome according
to a social welfare function.
In mechanism design the goal is to implement the social choice function. This means
that the outcome rule chooses the the most preferred outcome if the agents act rationally.
Preferably the mechanism designer considers mechanisms in which agents have dominant
actions, i.e. no matter the actions the other agents choose the dominant action is always the
best to choose. In this way the mechanism designer can predict the actions of agents, and
therefore the output that will be selected.
Assume that the agents’ types are private information. In this setting it is not possible to
implement the social choice function directly. Each agent a ∈ A has a set Ra of actions that it
might possibly take. A mechanism chooses an output based on the actions the agents take. A
mechanism is described by an outcome rule ω as well as payment functions pa for each a ∈ A.
These are defined as follows. An outcome rule ω is a function from the set R ≡ ∏a∈ARa to
the set O of outcomes. The payment function pa is a function from R to R and represents the
amount of money that agent a has to pay. A mechanism in which the action of the agent is to
report a type, i.e. Ra = Ta, is called a direct revelation mechanism.
For a given mechanism agents first choose their actions and after that an outcome is
chosen and the agents pay the payments. Agents can influence the choice of the outcome by
changing their actions. Moreover, these actions also influence the amount they have to pay.
In this paper an agent’s preference given his type ta is assumed to be given by a valuation
function va(ta, o) for outcomes o ∈ O. It is assumed that agents have quasi-linear utilities, i.e.
va(ta, o) is in monetary units and the net valuation (or payoff) for outcome o and payment
p is va(ta, o) − p. Payments are a way to transfer utility from one agent to another agent.
The utilities of the agents are Pareto optimal if no single agent can have more utility without
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decresing the utility of the other agents. By allowing payments it is assured that any Pareto
optimal solution maximizes the total valuation of the agents. A social choice function that
chooses an outcome that maximizes the total valuation is called a utilitarian social choice
function.
2.2 VCG mechanism
A well known direct revelation mechanism that implements the utilitarian social choice func-
tion is the Vickrey auction. In this auction bidders bid on a single good, i.e. they report on
their valuation for the good. The outcome is to sell the good to the bidder with the highest
bid. That bidder has to pay the second highest bid. The dominant action for all agents is to
bid their true valuation for the good. Therefore the good will be assigned to the agent with
the highest valuation for it.
The Vickrey auction is generalized in the class of VCG mechanisms, named after Vick-
rey [15], Clarke [5] and Groves [8]. These mechanisms implement the utilitarian social
choice function. Let t = (ta)a∈A and r = (ra)a∈A denote the true and reported preferences
respectively. Furthermore let va(ta, o) and va(ra, o) be the true and reported valuations of
agent a for outcome o. The social choice function ω : T → O chooses an outcome o ∈ O
that maximizes total welfare
∑
a∈A va(ta, o) given types t. This outcome is denoted by o(t).
The associated VCG mechanism chooses the outcome o(r) ∈ argmaxo∈O
∑
a∈A va(ra, o) when
agents report r. So this mechanism mimics ω when the agents report truthfully. And in fact
the VCG payments give the agents the incentive to report truthfully. Denote the maximal (re-
ported) total welfare by V (A, r) ≡ ∑a∈A va(ra, o(r)). The reported preferences of all agents
but a are denoted by r−a = (rb)b∈A\{a}. Finally let h(r−a) be an arbitrary function of the
reported preferences of all agents but a. The class of VCG mechanisms is then characterized
by the following payment by agent a ∈ A:
pa(r) ≡ h(r−a)− V (A, r) + va(ra, o(r)).
The Vickrey auction [15] is a special case of the class of VCG mechanisms. For the Vickrey
auction h(r−a) is equal to V (A \ {a}, r−a), i.e. the maximal reported welfare if agent a is
excluded from the auction. The net utility (or payoff) of agent a is then
va(ta, o(r))− [V (A \ {a}, r−a)− V (A, r) + va(ra, o(r))].
This reduces to V (A, t) − V (A \ {a}, t−a) if r = t. This expression is also called the Vickrey
payoff or the marginal contribution of agent a. In the following we assume h(r−a) = V (A \
{a}, r−a) when we talk about the VCG mechanism.
The VCGmechanism has several nice properties, see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [11].
The VCG mechanism is truth revealing or incentive compatible (IC), which means that for any
agent it is always best to report true preferences, no matter what the other agents do. Due
to this property the mechanism is also called efficient, as the mechanism maximizes total
reported welfare. Moreover, with the Vickrey payment function the mechanism is also indi-
vidual rational (IR), i.e. an agent has a non-negative payoff as long as the dominant action is
chosen.
In the next section we introduce a class of problems on which we apply the VCG mecha-
nism. Thereafter we introduce the agents-are-substitutes property. This property is important
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for the practical use of the VCG mechanism. Therefore we show that for our class of problems
the property holds.
3 A class of decentralized planning problems
3.1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a class of planning problems, namely continuous generalized as-
signment problems. A set of divisible goods has to be assigned to a set of agents. Each agent
has a given capacity and each type of good has some per unit capacity consumption. We
assume that the valuation of an agent is a linear function of the amount an agent gets of each
good. Such planning problems have applications in transportation as well as in production
planning. For example, consider a company that has to decide which freighters should trans-
port its sales to the customers. The company has long term agreements with the freighters
about the prices and available capacities. Due to the different locations of the freighters their
costs, and therefore their profit margins, differ. Given that the company wants to maintain
its long run relationship with the freighters, it is best to assign daily sales such that the total
profit of the freighters is maximized given the capacities.
First we introduce the computationally easy mathematical problem. The problem becomes
difficult when decision making is distributed over the agents. This will be discussed next. We
assume that decentralized decision making emerges when the knowledge of parameters of
the problem is distributed among agents.
3.2 The model
Let A be the set of agents and I the set of goods. Each agent a ∈ A has a per-unit valuation
vai for each good i ∈ I, and a resource capacity Ra. Each good i ∈ I requires an amount
rci of the resource for having one unit of that good. Without loss of generality all Ra and rci
take on integer values. The goal of the planning problem is to assign as much of the goods as
possible such that no capacity restrictions are violated and the total valuation is maximized.
The planning problem can be written as
maximize
∑
a∈A
∑
i∈I
vaixai
subject to: (PP)∑
i∈I
rcixai ≤ Ra ∀a ∈ A (1)∑
a∈A
xai ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I (2)
xai ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ I (3)
where xai is the fraction of good i assigned to agent a.
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We will consider two special cases of (PP). First, the case in which rci is equal to one for
each i. This problem has the integrality property as the constraint matrix is totally unimodular
and Ra is integer. We call this the assignment problem with capacities (APC). Second, the
subcase of (APC) that is also restricted to unit capacities, i.e. Ra = 1 for each agent a, is the
classical assignment problem (AP). The optimal objective value of a problem instance I of
(PP) is denoted by VPP (I). Furthermore, if I is also an instance of (APC) or (AP) we will
write VAPC(I) and VAP (I) respectively instead of VPP (I) to emphasize the character of I.
Problem (PP) is a model that does not have the integrality property in general. However
for general (integer) rci it is equivalent to a problem with the integrality property, i.e. it
has the same objective value and there is a clear correspondence between the solutions:
Consider a problem instance of (PP) with set of players A and set of goods I. Good i has an
(integer) resource consumption equal to rci. We can split good i into rci goods with resource
consumption equal to one. This set of goods is denoted by I(i). The valuation of agent a
for good ` ∈ I(i) is equal to va` = vai/rci. Let I◦ =
⋃
i∈I I(i) be the new set of goods.
Then the planning problem is equivalent to a problem instance of (APC) with set of agents A,
set of goods I◦ and valuations as given above. So any planning problem is equivalent to an
assignment problem with capacities with the same set of agents. Due to this it is sufficient to
prove the agents-are-substitutes property for (APC).
3.3 Decentralization and the VCG mechanism
We call (PP) the centralized problem. It can be solved by a single centralized planner in
polynomial time. The problem becomes interesting when decision power is distributed over
different agents. We assume that the valuations are privately known by the agents. In this
decentralized setting a planner can only solve the planning problem to optimality after the
agents report on their valuations. The planner has two problems. First, the planner has to
acquire the information from the agents, so he should make it profitable for the agents to
provide information. Second, the planner has to assure that the information given is correct.
If the agents know that the planner will believe everything they say, they might have an
opportunity to manipulate the planner’s decision.
This is exactly the setting that can be handled with mechanisms as introduced in section
2. We will apply the VCG mechanism on the decentralized planning problem. The individual
rationality property (IR) and the incentive compatibility property (IC) of the VCG mechanism
solve the two problems of the planner. The output function of the VCGmechanism is to choose
the optimal solution of (PP) with respect to the reported valuations, i.e. we assume that the
planner treats the reports as if it is the truth. In the setting of (PP) the VCG mechanism has a
third important property: it is (weakly) budget balanced, i.e. the sum of all the payments to
the planner is non-negative. So the planner does not have to pay to solve its problems. It can
easily be seen that even the individual payments in the planning problem are always positive,
which is assured by (1) and (2).
Suppose we reformulate a planning problem as an assignment problem with capacities
(APC). Then the integral decentralized problem is in fact very similar to a combinatorial
auction. In these auctions the agents have private information on their valuations for combi-
nations of goods and the auctioneer has to assign combinations of goods to the agents. The
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only difference with the combinatorial auction is that the bidders (agents) have a capacity.
The combinatorial auction can be formulated as a set-packing problem which is an NP-hard
problem, see for example De Vries and Vohra [17]. Moreover note that the size of the problem
is exponential in the number of goods as agents should value each subset of goods. However
the decentralized problem of (APC) is a polynomial problem as the valuation of the objects is
linear and the linear programming relaxation has an integral solution.
4 Important concepts in the VCG mechanism
4.1 Introduction
The VCGmechanism has some drawbacks that are troublesome for its applicability. One draw-
back is that in many situations it is vulnerable to manipulation of groups of agents, see for
example the discussion of the Vickrey auction by Ausubel and Milgrom [1]. Another draw-
back is that the mechanism needs the communication of a possibly exponential amount of
information. For example, in combinatorial Vickrey auctions, agents have to value any subset
of goods. Not only this communication complexity is problematic but in addition agents will
prefer to communicate as little information as possible. The first drawback disappears in case
the agents-are-substitutes property holds. The second drawback can be avoided or relieved if
this property holds.
In the following sections we introduce the concepts that are important with respect to the
VCG mechanism. First, we define the aforementioned agents-are-substitutes condition, and
the related and slightly stronger concept of submodularity. Second we underpin the agents-
are-substitutes property as a necessary condition for the existence of ascending price auctions.
Related to this we introduce the definition of pricing equilibria. Moreover we show the need
for the possibility of price discrimination. Thereafter we introduce the game theoretic core
concept that is related to pricing equilibria.
4.2 Substitutes and submodularity
Following Shapley [13], Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] defined the agents-are-substitutes prop-
erty as follows. Let R be a set and V a function on all subsets of R, V : 2R → R.
Definition 4.1 Elements in R are called substitutes with respect to function V if for all subsets
K ⊆ R:
V (R)− V (K) ≥
∑
a∈R\K
[V (R)− V (R \ {a})]. (4)
In this paper we use the stronger property of submodularity. For completeness we show
that agents are substitutes if V is a submodular function. We start with the definition of
submodularity which is also known as concavity in the field of game theory.
Definition 4.2 The function V : 2R → R is called a submodular function if for any two subsets
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K and L of R the following inequality holds:
V (K) + V (L) ≥ V (K ∪ L) + V (K ∩ L).
An equivalent characterization of submodularity is given in the following, see for example
Nemhauser and Wolsey [12].
Proposition 4.3 (Proposition 2.1 of Nemhauser and Wolsey [12, page 662]) The function
V : 2R → R is a submodular function if and only if for any set K ⊆ R and elements a, b /∈ K
with a 6= b the following holds:
V (K ∪ {a})− V (K) ≥ V (K ∪ {a, b})− V (K ∪ {b}).
Now it can easily be seen that the agents-are-substitutes property is implied by submodu-
larity.
Proposition 4.4 Consider the set function V : 2R → R. If V is a submodular function on the
set R, then the elements of R are substitutes with respect to V .
Proof:
We will prove that (4) holds for any K ⊆ R. This is clearly true for K = R, so consider an
arbitrary K ⊂ R. Let t = |R \ K| and R \ K = {a1, . . . , at}. Let τ be an arbitrary index in
{1, . . . , t}. By submodularity we know that
V (R \ {a1, . . . , aτ−1})− V (R \ {a1, . . . , aτ}) ≥ V (R)− V (R \ {aτ}).
We can add up these inequalities for all τ in {1, . . . , t}:
t∑
τ=1
[V (R \ {a1, . . . , aτ−1})− V (R \ {a1, . . . , aτ})] ≥
t∑
τ=1
[V (R)− V (R \ {aτ})] .
This is equivalent to:
V (R)− V (K) ≥
∑
a∈R\K
[V (R)− V (R \ {a})] ,
and the desired result follows. 2
It is easy to show that if |R| ≤ 3 submodularity is equivalent to the substitutes property.
4.3 Ascending price auctions
In some situations it is possible to replace the VCG mechanism with an ascending price auc-
tion and still get the same solution. An example of an ascending auction is the English auc-
tion. In the English auction bidders increase the price by outbidding each other until there
is only one bidder left that wants to pay the price. It is well known that the English auc-
tion is equivalent to the Vickrey auction, see Vickrey [15], but has the advantage that most
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of the agents have to communicate much less information or less precise information than
in the Vickrey auction itself. Bikhchandani et al. [3] give some other situations where such
ascending pricing mechanisms can be used to imitate the VCG mechanism. They work with
linear programming formulations in which dual variables correspond to prices and payoffs.
Primal-dual algorithms correspond in some cases to ascending auctions. However the mecha-
nism only converges to the VCG mechanism if the optimal dual variables (equilibrium prices)
correspond to the VCG prices. This is assured if agents are substitutes, and Bikhchandani et
al. [3] conjecture that this is also a necessary condition. De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [16]
show that the slightly stronger property of submodularity is in general a necessary condition:
They use a result of Ausubel and Milgrom [2] who proved for combinatorial auctions that
submodularity (and hence the agents-are-substitutes property) is implied by the gross sub-
stitutes property of goods. Goods are called gross substitutes if the demand for one good is
nondecreasing in the price of other goods. De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [16] argue that if
the agents-are-substitutes property does not hold then the goods are no gross substitutes for
at least one of the agents. They show that if goods are no substitutes for one agent, there
exist gross substitutes valuation profiles for the other agents such that no ascending auction
does yield the same transactions as the VCG mechanism.
Apart from the argument that ascending auctions need less communication, there is also
some empirical evidence that ascending auctions are more useful than the VCG mechanism
itself. In experimental tests of Kagel and Levin [9] it appears that in ascending auctions more
players actually play the equilibrium strategy compared to the Vickrey auction. Players learn
from the repetitive character of the auction and see less imaginary advantages from lying.
4.4 The VCG mechanism is not supported by anonymous prices
We start with the definition of a pricing equilibrium in the setting of (APC). Recall that the
planning problem can be transformed into an assignment problem with capacities (APC)
which has the integrality property. Let x = (xai)a∈A,i∈I be a feasible integral solution of
(APC), and X the set of all such solutions. Then {i ∈ I|xai = 1} is the set of goods that are
assigned to agent a by solution x. Furthermore, let X(a) = {xa|x ∈ X} be all possible values
that xa ≡ (xai)i∈I can have.
With this we can define paxa as the price that agent a pays for getting the goods corre-
sponding to xa ∈ X(a). Let p = (paxa)a∈A,xa∈X(a). These prices may depend on both the
combination of goods corresponding to xa and the receiving agent. With such prices agent
a’s quasi-linear utility from receiving xa is equal to uaxa(p) ≡
∑
i∈I vaixai − paxa . Here quasi-
linear means that the utility is equal to the monetary valuation of the set of goods minus the
amount paid for it. Suppose that the central planner of (APC) (called s) wants to maximize
its revenue. Therefore, its net utility from allocating goods according to allocation x ∈ X
equals usx(p) ≡
∑
a∈A paxa , the total amount of money received.
Definition 4.5 A pricing equilibrium for (APC) is a combination of x∗ ∈ X and prices paxa ≥
0, a ∈ A, such that
• uax∗a(p) = max
xa∈X(a)
[∑
i∈I
vaixai − paxa
]
for all a ∈ A,
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• usx∗(p) = max
x∈X
∑
a∈A
paxa .
Prices that do not discriminate between agents are called anonymous:
Definition 4.6 Prices p are called anonymous if pax◦ = pbx◦ for all a, b ∈ A and x◦ ∈ X(a) ∩
X(b).
The simplest anonymous prices are linear prices, i.e. prices that are just linear functions of
the amount of goods:
Definition 4.7 Prices p are called linear if for all a ∈ A and xa ∈ X(a) we can write paxa as∑
i∈I φixai. We call φi the per unit price of good i.
We now define a possible relationship between pricing equilibria and the VCG mechanism.
Let VAPC(B, I) be the optimal objective value for an instance of (APC) with set of agents B
allocating set of goods I.
Definition 4.8 A pricing equilibrium (x∗, p) is said to support the VCG mechanism if uax∗a(p) =
VAPC(A, I)− VAPC(A \ {a}, I) for all a ∈ A.
Leonard [10] showed for the assignment problem (AP) that the VCG mechanism is sup-
ported by some pricing equilibrium with linear prices. In section 5.4 we will see that there is
a similar result for the assignment problem with capacities (APC). For (APC) the VCG mecha-
nism is always supported by some pricing equilibrium, but here the prices are not necessarily
linear. We now show for (APC) that we really need the possibility of non-anonymous prices
for the VCG mechanism being supported by a pricing equilibrium.
Counterexample 4.9 Consider the following example of the planning problem. The set of agents
A consists of two agents a and b with capacities 1 and 2 respectively. The set of goods I consists
of three goods i, j and k all of them with resource consumption 1 (i.e. rci = rcj = rck = 1).
The agents’ valuations for the goods are in Table 1. An optimal solution for this problem is
i j k
a 6 5 2
b 5 4 1
Table 1: Valuations for APC
that agent a gets good k, and agent b gets goods i and j. So the optimal value of the objective
function is 11. To calculate the VCG-payoffs we also need the optimal values for the problems
with one agent less. Obviously VAPC({a}) = 6 as a chooses good i and VAPC({b}) = 9 as b
chooses goods i and j. The VCG-payoffs are pia = VAPC({a, b})− VAPC({b}) = 11− 9 = 2, and
pib = VAPC({a, b})− VAPC({a}) = 11− 6 = 5. For the optimal solution this means that agent a
pays 0 for good k (which gives the utility 2− 0 = 2), and agent b pays in total 4 for goods i and
j (which gives the utility of 5 + 4 − 4 = 5). The revenue for the planner is therefore 0 + 4 = 4.
With these values we get the following conflicting constraints for linear equilibrium prices:
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• The price of good i should be at least 4, otherwise agent a can improve its VCG-payoff by
getting good i and having payoff 6− φi.
• The price of good j should be at least 3, otherwise agent a can improve its VCG-payoff by
getting good j and having payoff 5− φj .
• With these minimum prices, b will have a net valuation for both goods i and j of 1. Given
its valuation for k of 1 and given its capacity, agent b can have a utility of at most 2, which
is less than its VCG-payoff.
Note that allowing non-linear prices (i.e. prices for bundles of goods) does not give an equilibrium
either. In that case we still have to define prices for single goods as the most simple type of bundles.
We conclude that the VCG-mechanism is not supported, in general, by any pricing equilibrium
with anonymous prices.
As said above, Leonard [10] showed for the assignment problem that the VCG mechanism
is supported by some pricing equilibrium with linear prices. He showed that this pricing equi-
librium can be found as a dual optimal solution of the assignment problem. Bikhchandani
and Ostroy [4] showed a similar result with non-anonymous prices for the the so-called pack-
age assignment problem (PAP). Their result only holds if the agents-are-substitutes property
holds. In section 5 we will see that (APC) is a special case of (PAP). This implies that the
result of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] also holds for (APC).
4.5 Core
As proven above, the VCG mechanism may not be supported by an anonymous pricing equi-
librium, i.e. it is not possible to announce goods prices such that each agent attains its VCG
payoff. In the remainder of this paper it will become clear that the VCG mechanism for (APC)
is supported by a general pricing equilibrium as described in definition 4.5. Bikhchandani and
Ostroy [4] showed that there is a strong relation between such a pricing equilibrium and the
the game theoretical concept of core. Before we present this concept, we give the definition
of a transferable utility game (TU game).
Definition 4.10 A transferable utility game is a pair (B, v) with set of players B and character-
istic function v : 2B → R with v(Ø) = 0.
In the following we define the core of a TU game.
Definition 4.11 The core of the TU game (B, v) is the set of all allocations θ ∈ RB that are
feasible with respect the following restrictions:∑
q∈K
θq ≥ v(K) ∀K ⊂ B∑
q∈B
θq = v(B).
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From planning problem (PP) we define the following TU game. Consider the agents in the
planning problem and the central planner, called c, as players of the game, so B = A ∪ {c}.
Let v(K ∪ {c}) be equal to the objective value of (PP) if the agents in K ⊆ A and the planner
c are available, which is denoted by VPP (K). So v(K ∪ {c}) = VPP (K). Let v(K) be equal to
zero for any set of players K ⊆ A.
One can see that a core allocation of the TU game associated with the planning problem is
an allocation of the optimal objective value VPP (A, I) over the agents and the planner with a
nice property, namely no subset of players (called coalition) has an incentive to act separately.
In section 5.4 we will see that any core allocation implies a pricing equilibrium and any pricing
equilibrium implies a core allocation. Moreover, the VCG mechanism corresponds to a core
allocation in case the agents-are-substitutes condition is satisfied.
5 Package assignment problem
5.1 Introduction
The planning problem we introduced above is a special case of the package assignment prob-
lem of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4]. Therefore its properties apply to the planning problem.
In this section we will first introduce the package assignment problem. Second, we show
that (PP) is a special case of it. Finally we discuss some properties of the package assign-
ment problem that are proven by Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4]. They show that any core
allocation implies a pricing equilibrium and any pricing equilibrium implies a core alloca-
tion. Moreover, the payoffs of the VCG mechanism correspond to a core allocation only if the
agents-are-substitutes condition is satisfied.
5.2 Model
Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] studied the package assignment problem (PAP). Their setting is
an exchange economy where individuals trade packages of several kinds of indivisible goods.
Individuals are divided into buyers and sellers. Each seller owns a number of goods while
its valuation for ownership of goods is always zero. A buyer, on the other hand, does assign
nonnegative value to owning (a set of) goods but has no initial endowment. Buyers are
therefore willing to pay for the goods. The valuations are assumed to be weakly increasing
in amounts per good. Sellers maximize the amount of money they receive while buyers
maximize their net benefits from buying goods. Here it is assumed that the net benefits or
utilities are quasi-linear, i.e. total utility is the sum of the monetary valuation for goods and the
monetary transaction. Total welfare is therefore equal to the total monetary valuation of the
buyers for the goods they acquire. The aim of the package assignment problem is to exchange
packages of goods such that the total welfare over all buyers and sellers is maximized.
In the one seller setting, the package assignment problem reduces to a combinatorial
auction. In this restricted setting the package assignment problem can be written as follows
(see Bikhchandani et al. [3]). Let B be a set of buyers andM a set of goods to be sold by the
seller indicated by s. Let z = (zb)b∈B denote a partition of the goods where zb denotes the
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set of goods (or package) allocated to buyer b. The set of all possible partitions is denoted
by Z. Let ybS be a binary variable that is equal to 1 if buyer b gets set of goods S ⊆ M
and zero otherwise. The valuation of buyer b for the set S is vbS ≥ 0. Moreover let Yz be a
binary variable that is equal to 1 if the seller chooses partition z and zero otherwise. Then let
VPAP (B) be the optimal objective value of the following winner determination problem with
set of buyers B:
maximize
∑
b∈B
∑
S⊆M
vbSybS
subject to: (PAP)∑
S⊆M
ybS ≤ 1 ∀b ∈ B (5)∑
z∈Z
Yz ≤ 1 (6)
ybS ≤
∑
z∈Z:zb=S
Yz ∀b ∈ B,∀S ⊆M (7)
ybS ∈ {0, 1} ∀b ∈ B,∀S ⊆M
Yz ∈ {0, 1} ∀z ∈ Z.
Constraints (5) impose that each buyer gets at most one package. Constraint (6) says that
the seller chooses at most one partition of the goods. Note that the seller may restrict itself
without loss of generality to partitions as valuations are nonnegative and buyers have no
capacities. The third set of constraints (7) restricts buyers to the package that is offered by
the seller. This restriction reflects an economy with no resale possibilities, which is called
E3 in Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4]. If buyers can exchange the packages that are offered to
them, (called economy E2) constraints (7) are replaced by the following constraint:∑
b∈B
ybS ≤
∑
z∈Z:zb=S,b∈B
Yz ∀S ⊆M. (8)
If buyers can exchange also individual objects (economy E1) the restriction reduces to the
requirement that buyers receive non-overlapping sets of objects:∑
b∈B
∑
S⊆M :i∈S
ybS ≤ 1 ∀i ∈M. (9)
Effectively the choice Yz of the seller has become irrelevant in this case. For the case of
multiple sellers Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] also have a fourth economy E4. In this setting
packages can also be distinguished by the seller. Economy E3 then reflects the case in which
sellers can replace each other without approval of the buyer. Economy E4 forbids such a
seller replacement. As we only consider the single seller case, we do not need the distinction
between E3 and E4. Moreover, the main results of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] only apply to
the single seller case.
From the optimization point of view (PAP) has some redundancy, there are two sets of
variables that choose a partition: Y for a preliminary allocation, and y for a final allocation.
The restrictions for the resale possibilities limit the difference between the two allocations.
However, note that any type of resale restrictions allows for all possible partitions of the
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goods. The reason to model the underlying optimization problem as an exchange economy is
that the dual variables of constraints (7), (8) and (9) can be interpreted as prices of addressed
packages, anonymous packages and anonymous goods respectively. These are the types of
prices that may exist in economies E3, E2 and E1 respectively. As we proved in section 4.4
that anonymous prices are not sufficient to support the VCG mechanism for the decentralized
planning problem, we will only consider economy E3.
5.3 Special case
Our decentralized planning problem is very similar to the package assignment problem. In
section 3.2 we showed that any instance of the continuous planning problem is equivalent
to an instance of (APC) that has the integrality property. We may therefore restrict ourselves
to problems with rci = 1 that have the integrality property. This also means that for finding
an optimal planning, we can restrict ourselves to integral solutions. Therefore the task of the
planner is to assign each good to one agent. This is the same as the task of the seller in (PAP).
There are two important differences between our planning problem and the package as-
signment problem. On one hand the planning problem is easier as it deals with linear valua-
tions instead of general weakly increasing valuation functions. On the other hand it is more
difficult because of the capacities the agents face. This means that both sides of the economy
have capacity restrictions. However, the capacities can easily be implemented in the package
assignment setting by assuming disposability. This means that an agent’s valuation of a set of
goods is equal to the highest valued subset that fulfills its capacity constraint. We may observe
that these valuations are weakly increasing. In this way the capacity constraints are imple-
mented in the valuation function, and the planning problem appears to be a special case of
the package assignment model. Therefore, all the results shown for the package assignment
model by Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] also hold for our planning problem. In section 5.4 we
will present the results that are relevant for our discussion.
5.4 Properties
As already said, in this paper we will focus on the single seller case of the package assign-
ment problem, even though some of the results of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] are also true
for multiple sellers. Problem (PAP) is a generalization of the classical assignment problem.
Leonard [10] proved for the classical assignment problem that a dual optimal solution corre-
sponds both to a linear pricing equilibrium and the VCG solution. The results of Bikhchandani
and Ostroy [4] are a generalization of the work of Leonard. The first result for the package
assignment problem is about pricing equilibria.
Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] proved that a pricing equilibrium (as defined in section 4.4)
corresponds to an integral optimal solution of the linear program (PAP).
Theorem 5.1 (Theorem 3.1 of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4]) A combination of a solution
for (PAP) and prices pbS for all buyers b ∈ B and all S ⊆M is a pricing equilibrium if and only if
the solution is optimal for (PAP) and the combination of the prices and the payoffs of the buyers
and seller constitute a dual optimal solution of the LP-relaxation of (PAP).
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From this theorem one can conclude that pricing equilibria are efficient, and have a one-to-
one correspondence with dual optimal optimal solutions of (PAP). The following theorem also
gives a one-to-one correspondence between core allocations and pricing equilibria. Similar
as we defined a TU game for (PP) in section 4.5, we may define a TU game for the package
assignment model.
Theorem 5.2 (Theorem 5.1 of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4]) A combination of a solution
for (PAP) and prices pbS for all buyers b ∈ B and all S ⊆M is a pricing equilibrium if and only
if the corresponding payoffs of the buyers and seller constitute a core allocation of VPAP (B) over
B ∪ {s}.
So combining the two theorems, there is a one-to-one correspondence between pricing equi-
libria and core allocations. Moreover Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4] show that the core is
nonempty: giving the seller a payoff of VPAP (B) and all the buyers a payoff of zero fulfills all
core constraints.
The substitutes property of the buyers is the necessary and sufficient condition for which
the VCG mechanism leads to both a core allocation of the total utilities and a certain pricing
equilibrium.
Theorem 5.3 (Theorem 6.1 of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4]) The following statements are
equivalent for (PAP):
(i) Buyers are substitutes.
(ii) The payoff vector of the VCG mechanism is a core allocation of VPAP (B) over B ∪ {s}.
(iii) The VCG mechanism corresponds to the pricing equilibrium in E3 with prices that are the
lowest possible equilibrium prices for all buyers.
As pricing equilibria correspond to optimal solutions of the dual linear programming problem
of (PAP), statement (iii) of Theorem 5.3 also implies that the VCG mechanism corresponds to
an optimal dual solution that minimizes the payments of the buyers. An important implication
of this is that all VCG-payments and prices can be calculated in two steps. First we calculate
the optimal solution for (PAP). Second, we find the optimal dual solution that minimizes
the prices of the bidders. In this way we get the VCG payoffs by solving only two linear
programming problems. Note that this considerably lowers the computational burden as by
using the definition of VCG payments we would have to calculate VPAP (B \{b}) for all b ∈ B.
6 The substitutes property for the planning problem
6.1 Introduction
In the previous sections we saw that the agents-are-substitutes property is important with
respect to the possible implementation of the VCG mechanism. In this section we prove that
the planning problem has the agents-are-substitutes property. In fact we prove the stronger
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property of submodularity. The proof is done in three steps. First we prove that the classical
assignment problem is submodular. This is a generalization of a result of Shapley [13] who
proved the agents-are-substitutes property. Second we generalize the submodularity property
to the assignment problem with capacities (APC). Finally the submodularity of the planning
problem is an easy consequence. In section 6.4 it is shown that the planning problem retains
the submodularity property when the valuations become concave piecewise linear due to
additional capacities.
6.2 The assignment problem is submodular
In this section we consider the planning problem where the capacities Ra and the resource
consumption rci are equal to one. As said before this is the classical assignment problem (AP).
In this section we prove that the assignment problem is submodular with respect to the set
of agents. In the following we will consider related instances of the assignment problem. In
order to discriminate between these problem instances we use the notation AP (A, I) which
indicates an instance of the assignment problem with agent set A and set of goods I. The
optimal solution value of AP (A, I) is denoted by VAP (A, I).
Theorem 6.1 The function VAP (·, I) : 2A → R is submodular in A.
Proof:
It is enough to prove that the conditions in Proposition 4.3 are fulfilled. The proof is by
induction on the cardinality of the set of agents A. We may observe that the conditions of
Proposition 4.3 only make sense when |A| ≥ 2.
Suppose A = {a, b} and K = Ø. Obviously VAP (Ø, I) = 0. Moreover we know that
VAP ({a}, I) + VAP ({b}, I) ≥ VAP ({a, b}, I) because of optimality of the left hand side. Com-
bining these observations, we get
VAP ({a}, I)− VAP (Ø, I) ≥ VAP ({a, b}, I)− VAP ({b}, I).
As we chose a and b arbitrarily, the function VAP (·, I) is submodular for |A| = 2.
Suppose that the conditions in Proposition 4.3 are fulfilled for |A| = k, k ≥ 2. Then we
want to show the submudularity result for |A| = k + 1. Let K ⊆ A be a set of k − 1 agents
and let a and b be two arbitrary agents not in K, a 6= b. First we prove that the marginal
value of an additional good will not decrease if we add an arbitrary agent to an instance of
the assignment problem with k − 1 agents, i.e. for i ∈ I we have:
VAP (K, I)− VAP (K, I \ {i}) ≤ VAP (K ∪ {b}, I)− VAP (K ∪ {b}, I \ {i}). (10)
Consider the instance AP (K, I) of the assignment problem and suppose that it is optimal to
assign good i to agent c. Then:
VAP (K, I)− VAP (K, I \ {i})
= vci + VAP (K \ {c}, I \ {i})− VAP (K, I \ {i})
≤ vci + VAP ((K ∪ {b}) \ {c}, I \ {i})− VAP (K ∪ {b}, I \ {i})
≤ VAP (K ∪ {b}, I)− VAP (K ∪ {b}, I \ {i}).
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The equality holds by the definition of good i. The first inequality is due to the induction
hypothesis. The final inequality holds because VAP (K ∪ {b}, I) is the value of an optimal
assignment. If i is not assigned to any agent, then expression (10) holds trivially as the left
hand side will equal zero.
Now we are able to show the submodularity result when |A| = k+1. Consider the problem
instance AP (K ∪ {a, b}, I), and suppose that it is optimal to assign good j to agent a. Then
we have:
VAP (K ∪ {a, b}, I)− VAP (K ∪ {b}, I)
= vaj + VAP (K ∪ {b}, I \ {j})− VAP (K ∪ {b}, I)
≤ vaj + VAP (K, I \ {j})− VAP (K, I)
≤ VAP (K ∪ {a}, I)− VAP (K, I).
The first inequality holds because of (10). The second inequality holds because VAP (K ∪
{a}, I) is the optimal value of AP (K ∪ {a}, I). So we found the following:
VAP (K ∪ {a}, I)− VAP (K, I) ≥ VAP (K ∪ {a, b}, I)− VAP (K ∪ {b}, I).
If there is no good assigned to agent a this inequality still holds as the right hand side will be
equal zero, and thus the desired result follows. 2
The theorem above is an extension of the result of Shapley [13] who proved that the as-
signment problem had the substitutes property with respect to the agents. According to
Proposition 4.4, the result of Shapley follows from Theorem 6.1.
6.3 The assignment problem with capacities is submodular
In this section we analyze the assignment problem with capacities (APC), i.e. consumptions
rci are equal to one, like in the assignment problem, but capacities are arbitrary integers. We
will show that this problem is still submodular. Let APC(A, I) denote a problem instance of
(APC) with set of agents A with resource capacities (Ra)a∈A, and set of goods I. The optimal
value of APC(A, I) is denoted by VAPC(A, I).
Theorem 6.2 The function VAPC(·, I) : 2A → R is submodular in A.
Proof:
In order to show that the problem is submodular we construct an equivalent classical assign-
ment problem. For each a ∈ A, we split agent a into Ra agents, say a1, . . . , aRa , with resource
capacity 1 and the same valuations as agent a. Let A◦ denote the new set of agents. It is easy
to see that the assignment problem AP (A◦, I) has the same objective value as APC(A, I).
From Theorem 6.1 we know that AP (A◦, I) is submodular with respect to the set of agents
A◦. Let K ⊆ A and K◦ be the corresponding agents in A◦. For a, b /∈ K with a 6= b we have
that
VAPC(K ∪ {a}, I)− VAPC(K, I)
= VAP (K◦ ∪ {a1, . . . , aRa}, I)− VAP (K◦, I)
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≥ VAP (K◦ ∪ {a1, . . . , aRa} ∪ {b1}, I)− VAP (K◦ ∪ {b1}, I)
≥
...
≥ VAP (K◦ ∪ {a1, . . . , aRa} ∪ {b1, . . . , bRb}, I)− VAP (K◦ ∪ {b1, . . . , bRb}, I)
= VAPC(K ∪ {a, b}, I)− VAPC(K ∪ {b}, I),
in which the inequalities follow by the submodularity of the assignment problem, and the
desired result holds. 2
Topkis [14] has proved that the transportation problem is a submodular function of the
agents’ capacities. The transportation problem is an equivalent formulation to (APC) in terms
of cost minimization. The proof above is shorter and more intuitive.
Recall from section 3 that any planning problem is equivalent to an instance of (APC).
Let PP (A, I) be an instance of the planning problem with set of agents A and set of goods
I. Let I◦ be the new set of goods that emerges by splitting the goods of I. Then we know
that VPP (A, I) = VAPC(A, I◦). As VAPC(A, I◦) is submodular in A, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 6.3 The function VPP (·, I) : 2A → R is submodular in A.
6.4 Concave piecewise linear valuations
In this section we discuss a generalization of the planning problem that still has the substitutes
property with respect to the agents. Assume that agents can hire limited amounts of addi-
tional resource capacity, say human resources or overtime. Let Rea be the maximum overtime
that agent a can hire for wage we per unit. Furthermore let E be the set of possible overtime
wages. As an agent will first use its cheapest resource capacity, the problem corresponds to
concave piecewise linear valuation functions. Consider the following model,
maximize
∑
a∈A
∑
i∈I
vaixai −
∑
e∈E
∑
a∈A
weoea
subject to: (PPO)∑
i∈I
rcixai ≤ Rfixeda +
∑
e∈E
oea ∀a ∈ A
oea ≤ Rea ∀a ∈ A, ∀e ∈ E∑
a∈A
xai ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
xai ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ I
oea ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, ∀e ∈ E
where oea is the overtime of wage w
e hired by agent a. In this problem Rfixeda is the fixed
(normal) capacity of agent a.
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We show that the optimal value of the objective function of (PPO) is still a submodular
function of the set of agents. We do this by reformulating it as a planning problem with
linear valuations. Let PPO(A, I) denote a problem instance of the planning problem with
overtime with set of agents A and set of goods I. Denote the optimal value of PPO(A, I)
by VPPO(A, I). Agent a can be split into 1 + |E| agents with capacities Rfa and Rea, e ∈ E
respectively. The first new agent has valuations vai that correspond to the use of the fixed
capacity, and the other new agents have valuations vai − werci that correspond to using the
overtime of wage we, e ∈ E with rate rci. Let A◦ be the new set of agents with the valuations
and capacities as given above. Then VPPO(A, I) = VPP (A◦, I). Similarly to the proof of
Theorem 6.2 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 6.4 The function VPPO(·, I) : 2A → R is submodular in A.
7 Impossibilities
7.1 Introduction
In section 6 we proved that the planning problem is submodular in the set of agents, and
therefore has the agents-are-substitutes property according to Proposition 4.4. Moreover for
a generalization with concave piecewise linear valuations the problem retains this property.
Unfortunately the agents-are-substitutes property gets lost for other rather natural and small
extensions of the planning problem. So far we assumed that the goods are divisible. For
example, the transport of oil can easily be divided over different carriers. On the contrary,
many goods are indivisible. For example, you can not split a cow over different cattle-trucks.
We will therefore analyze the planning problem when goods are indivisible in section 7.2.
Another extension of the planning problem arises from its application in production planning.
In many real-life settings production capacity is only available after the production line has
been set up. For this we take setup costs into account in section 7.3.
7.2 Generalized assignment problem
We have seen that when the resource consumptions rci are equal to one, we can assume
without loss of optimality that the variables xai are binary. In this section we study the
planning problem where each good should be assigned to exactly one agent, i.e. problem
(PP) where the nonnegativity constraints (3) on xai are replaced by
xai ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ I.
This problem is also known as the generalized assignment problem (GAP). An instance of
the problem is denoted by GAP (A, I) with A the set of agents and I the set of goods. The
optimal objective function of such an instance is denoted by VGAP (A, I).
Again, the substitutes property does not hold in general. Consider the following problem
instance. We have three agents, a, b and c with capacities 2, 2 and 1 respectively, and three
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goods, i, j and k with resource consumption 2, 1 and 1 respectively. The agents’ valuations
for the goods are given in Table 2.
i j k
a 6 5 5
b 0 0 3
c 0 3 0
Table 2: Valuations for GAP
Consider problem instances GAP (K, I) for the following K ⊆ A.
• For K = {a, b, c} we have VGAP (K, I) = 12:
Agent a gets good i,
Agent b gets good k,
Agent c gets good j.
• For K = {a, c} we have VGAP (K, I) = 10:
Agent a gets goods j and k.
• For K = {a, b} we have VGAP (K, I) = 10:
Agent a gets goods j and k.
Agent b gets good i.
• For K = {a} we have VGAP (K, I) = 10:
Agent a gets goods j and k.
Now the following substitutes condition is violated, with V (·) ≡ VGAP (·, I):
V ({a, b, c})− V ({a}) ≥ V ({a, b, c})− V ({a, c}) + V ({a, b, c})− V ({a, b})
as well as the following submodularity condition
V ({a, c})− V ({a}) ≥ V ({a, b, c})− V ({a, b}).
7.3 Setup costs
The planning problem assumes a linear valuation function for the agents. In this section we
include a setup costs fa in the valuation function, i.e.,
maximize
∑
a∈A
∑
i∈I
vaixai −
∑
a∈A
faya
subject to: (PPS)∑
i∈I
rcixai ≤ Raya ∀a ∈ A∑
a∈A
xai ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
xai ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ I
ya ∈ {0, 1} ∀a ∈ A
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where xai is defined as before and ya is equal to one if agent a (partially) processes at least
one good. An instance of the problem is denoted by PPS(A, I) with A the set of agents
and I the set of goods. The optimal objective function of such an instance is denoted by
VPPS(A, I). We show by giving a counterexample that (PPS) does not enjoy the agents-are-
substitutes property. Consider the following problem instance. We have three agents, a, b and
c all three with capacity 2, and setup costs of 10, 1 and 1 respectively. There are four goods,
i, j, k and m, all with resource consumption equal to 1. The agents’ valuations for the goods
are given in Table 3.
i j k m
a 4 4 6 6
b 1 1 2 1
c 1 1 1 10
Table 3: Valuations for PPS
Consider problem instances PPS(K, I) for the following K ⊆ A.
• For K = {a, b, c} we have VPPS(K, I) = 12:
Agent a gets no goods,
Agent b gets goods i and k,
Agent c gets goods j and m.
• For K = {a, c} we have VPPS(K, I) = 10:
Agent a gets goods i and k,
Agent c gets goods j and m.
• For K = {a, b} we have VPPS(K, I) = 3:
Agent a gets good k and m,
Agent b gets good i and j.
• For K = {a} we have VPPS(K, I) = 2:
Agent a gets good k and m.
Now the following substitutes condition is violated, with V (·) ≡ VPPS(·, I):
V ({a, b, c})− V ({a}) ≥ V ({a, b, c})− V ({a, c}) + V ({a, b, c})− V ({a, b}),
as well as the submodularity condition
V ({a, c})− V ({a}) ≥ V ({a, b, c})− V ({a, b}).
Problem (PPS) can be formulated as a special case of (PAP) for which weakly increasing
valuations are assumed. The setup costs cause downward jumps in the valuations of the
agents. By assuming disposability we can set the negative part of these functions equal to
zero. Observe that the optimal solution to this problem is not necessarily a partition of the
goods.
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8 Conclusions and further research
In this paper we introduced a class of planning problems where the decision power is dis-
tributed over the agents. The VCG mechanism is a well known instrument to deal with those
decentralized settings, but it may be impractical. Many authors pointed out the importance
of the agents-are-substitutes property for the practical applicability of the VCG mechanism.
Although it is known that the property is important in several settings few problems or sub-
classes of problems are proven to have the property. We proved for our planning problem that
the agents-are-substitutes property holds, and that even the stronger property of submodular-
ity holds. Moreover we showed that by introducing setup costs, which makes the valuations
partly convex, the agents-are-substitutes property does not hold in general. The same is true
for the integer version of our problem class, which is known as the generalized assignment
problem.
The importance of the agents-are-substitutes property and the submodularity property is
respectively shown by Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4], and De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [16]
and Bikhchandani et al. [3]. First, our planning problem can be reformulated as a special case
of the package assignment problem introduced by Bikhchandani and Ostroy [4]. In this prob-
lem the agents-are substitutes property is a necessary and sufficient condition for the VCG
mechanism to correspond to a pricing equilibrium. We showed that we can not restrict our-
selves to linear pricing equilibria as in some cases price discrimination is needed. Second, due
to the results of De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [16] and Bikhchandani et al. [3] submodu-
larity implies that there exists an ascending auction that implements the VCG mechanism.
The class of problems we encountered in this paper is inspired by supply chain planning.
We gave an example of a company that has to decide which freighters should transport its
sales to the customers. The company wants to maximize the total profit of the freighters by
assigning daily sales appropriately. In this example the actions of the freighters are aligned
by the VCG mechanism. All these freighters are part of one level in a supply chain, and are
proven to be substitutes. In the future we want to investigate the applicability of mechanism
design to settings in which the different suppliers and buyers in a supply chain are the agents
whose actions should be aligned to improve supply chain performance. In this setting a buyer
and its supplier are each others complements. Therefore the VCG mechanism does not seem
to be applicable.
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